The 1975 national economic program: another exercise in fiscal activism by Keith M. Carlson
TI,
I HE Administration recently announced its na-
tional economic program for 1975 to Congress and
the public. The general nature of the program was
disclosed in the President’s State of the Union message
and the details were provided later in three documents
— the Federal Budget, the Economic Report of the
President, and the Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers. These three documents present
(1) Federal budget plans for the 21-monthperiod end-
ing September 30, 1976, (2) economic projections for
the years 1975 through 1980, and (3) general sug-
gestions as to the appropriate course for monetary
actions.
Economic goals for 1975 are stated in the Annual
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
and represent the CEA’s estimate of the most likely
outcome, given economic and policy forces already set
in motion, along with a future plan for monetary and
fiscal action. Economic projections for 1975 include
growth in GNP of 7.3 percent which is distributed as
a 3.3 percent decline in real product and a 10.8 per-
cent advance in prices. The unemployment rate is
projected to average 8,1 percent in 1975. These pro-
jections are to be viewed within the perspective of a
longer-range economic projection extending to 1980)
This set of long-range projections is amajor innovation
that recognizes the long lags that are inherent in the
economic process, and provides a set of economic
assumptions that is consistent with attaining the ulti-
mate goals of full employment and price stability. In
addition to these well-known goals, a third economic
goal is introduced as a part of the economic program
— energy independence.
As a part of the overall economic program, a very
ambitious plan for Federal budget action is proposed.
Included in this Federal budget plan is an increase of
1
Projections for the years 1976 through 1980 are not found
in the CEA Report but are found in The Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976, pp. 40-42. The
projections for 1975 and 1976 are classified as forecasts of
probable economic conditions, but the projections for 1977
through 1980 are called simply “projections consistent with
















Federal expenditures (national income accounts basis)
of 15.5 percent in calendar 1975, which reflects an
allowance for increased costs of energy to Federal,
state, and local governments, cash payments to indi-
vidualswho do not paytaxes, and a proposed reduction
in spending relative to what it would otherwise be. In
addition, many tax changes are proposed. Among
these changes are: (1) a one-shot tax rebate toindivid-
uals on 1974 incomes; (2) an investment tax credit for
corporations; (3) a windfall-profits tax on oil com-
panies; (4) a reduction in tax rates on individual and
corporate income; and (5) an increase in the excise
tax on oil and natural gas.
Although the emphasis of the Administration’s pro-
gram is on fiscal actions, the CEA Report provides
some subtle recommendations for monetary policy. In
contrast to last year’s Report, no specific guidelines
are offered. The recommendation consists of the gen-
eral statement that “monetary policy must be con-
ducted so as to encourage a near-term recovery in the
economy and a resumption of sustainable economic
growth.”
The 1975 National Economic Program: Another
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The purpose of this article is to summarize and
evaluate the Administration’s 1975 economic program.2
Even though the Budget and the CEA Report en-
compass many economic issues, the focus of this article
is on the stabilization aspects of the economic pro-
gram. As background, economic events in 1974 are
summarized and examined along with Administration
projections that were made in February 1974. The
Federal budget program is then examined in some
detail along with the general recommendations for
monetary policy. Finally, the economic program is
analyzed in terms of its feasibility, given the Adminis-
tration’s policy recommendations, and its internal con-
sistency with reference to CNP, prices, and output.
REVIEW OF
THE 1974 ECONOMIC PROGRAM
At the outset of 1974, the U.S. economy was caught
between the crosscurrents of high inflationand a slow-
down in real product growth. In addition, the energy
crisis was a factor complicating the assessment of the
economic outlook. After growing very rapidly in real
terms in 1972 and in early 1973, output growth slowed
in the second quarter of 1973. Despite the slowdown
in output, inflation continued at very high rates and
shortages of basic materials were common, with wage
and price controls still in effect at the outset of 1974.
The objective of Administration policy in early 1974
was to avoid extreme policy actions while aiming
toward a resumption of real growth and a decline in
the inflation rate. The CEA felt that both monetary
and fiscal actions had become less stimulative in the
second half of 1973 and recommended a continuation
of this moderate policy stance. In general, for the first
half of calendar 1974 the CEA projected little change
in output along with continued high inflation, followed
in the second half by a resumption of real growth and
a sharp decline in the rate of price advance. Under-
lying this projection was the assumption that the bulk
of the adjustment to higher energy prices would be
completed in the first half of the year.
Economic Projection~sor, the Rec-ord
The 1974 CEA Report projected an increase in GNP
for the year of 7.9 percent. Based on preliminary data
for the fourth quarter the realized increase was ex-
2
The Administration’s program is analyzed in the form in
which it was presented in early February 1975. Indications
at this time are that Congressional actions on expenditures
and taxes will certainly modify the Administrations program
as originally presented. This article makes iso attempt to
allow for the effects of pending legislation.
actly as the CEA projected—7.9 percent. This is the
most accurate projection of GNP since the CEA
started giving quantitative forecasts in 1962 (see Table
I) .~ The accuracy of the projection was all the more
remarkable when account is taken of the uncertainties
which prevailed at the beginning of the year relating
to the energy crisis.
The composition of the GNP forecast along with the
outcome is shown in Table II. As is typical of most any
accurate projection of GNP, the total reflected off-
setting errors in the components. Personal consump-
PROJ D ANb ACTUA CHANGES IN CNP
AND COMPONENTS. 1fl3 10 1974
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tion, state and local purchases, and net exports were
all underestimated. Overestimated were business fixed
investment, inventory accumulation, residential con-
struction, and Federal purchases. Nevertheless, rela-
tive to past projection experience, the CEA’s 1974
forecast of nominal magnitudes was quite accurate
even when examined on a component-by-component
basis.
More significant from the standpoint of economic
policy is the distribution of the CNP change between
prices and output. As indicated in Table III, the CEA
projected a 1 percent advance in output, which was
predicted to take the form of a decline in the first
half of the year followed by a relatively strong ex-
pansion in the second half. The pattern of output
changes during the year deviated substantially from
this forecast. Output fell in each quarter, with the
first and fourth quarters showing large annual rates of
decline of 7 and 9 percent, respectively. From 1973
to 1974 output declined 2.2 percent on an annual
average basis. However, the extent of the decline is
obscured by comparing averages for the two years,
as output fell 5 percent from fourth quarter 1973 to
fourth quarter 1974.
Table Ill
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL CHANGES IN
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: 1973 TO 1974
Projectia n Actua Error
GNP 7,9% 7.9% 0.0%
Output 1,0 —2,2 3,2
Price, 6.9 10.2 ‘3.3
Unemployment tote 5,6 5.6 0.0
There was also substantial error in the CEA’s pro-
jection of prices. The projection of a 6.9 percent ad-
vance compares with the realized increase of 10.2
percent. Again, the average for the year obscures the
extent of the en-or. The CEA expected rapid inflation
in the first half of the year followed by a slowing in
the second half. The actual pattern of price advance
was one of double-digit inflation throughout the year,
or 11.8 percent when measured from fourth quarter
1973 to fourth quarter 1974.
il--i-cq Jieco-nzii’ien-ctotio-n-s-vs. Re-a-lizotioris
Any ex post evaluation of an economic forecast is
incomplete until the underlying policy assumptions
are also examined. An accurate GNP projection might
well be right, but for the wrong reasons. Furthermore,
a full evaluation of a forecast requires an understand-
ing of the underlying model, and, in particular, the
role that policy actions play in that model. In the case
of the CEA projection, the underlying model is not
made explicit, though it is usuallyinterpreted as more
of a judgmental model than an econometric model.
The CEA forecasters, however, are fully aware of
the results of other models, and their projections
probably are not fully independent of such models.
This section examines the Federal budget program
in retrospect, along with their recommendations for
monetary policy. The conclusion is that the CEA fore-
cast of GNP was accurate because monetary and fiscal
actions did not depart substantially from the course
envisioned by the CEA early in the year.
Fiscal Ps-Pie — The 1974 Federal budget program
is compared with the outcome in Table IV. Federal
expenditures were overestimated for the year, though
the amount was not substantial. At the time the 1974
CEA Report appeared there were reservations in some
quarters as to the likelihood of calendar 1974 Federal
expenditures increasing as rapidly as assumed.4
In contrast to expenditures, receipts were under-
estimated. The unexpectedly rapid advance of Fed-
eral receipts was attributable primarily to the pace of
inflation. Inflationary advances in incomes push tax-
payers into higher tax brackets and lower the real
value of standard deductions and exemptions. Con-
sequently, given the nature of the progressive income
tax, inflation acts as a tax increase, raising the average
‘See Keith M, Carlson, “The 1974 National Economic Plan:
Riding Out the Storm,” this Review (March 1974), pp. 2-10.
Demand and Production




L,t.,td,,,pF,,,d-oth q,,,,, l974~-,h,,Fed 01,0
““‘S’s—
972 1973 974 9975
,‘,‘,—-S-S. D,pe’,,,,, ‘S
Page 4FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1975
Table IV
PLANNED AND ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE
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the case of corporations, inventory profits (which were
substantial in 1974) are taxed like all other profits even
though they are temporary and tend to be eliminated
when inventories are replaced at higher prices.
Another factor working to transfer funds from cor-
porations to the Federal Government is the rate of
depreciation on plant and equipment allowable for tax
purposes. Depreciation calculated according to his-
torical cost increases accounting profits more rapidly
than economic profits when replacement costs exceed
depreciation allowances. Corporate taxes are assessed
against accounting profits, and thus the effective cor-
porate tax rate on economic profits increases during
periods of substantial inflation.
By overestimating the growth in Federal expendi-
tures and underestimating the increase in receipts, the
net budget deficit was overestimated by a substantial
amount. The original NIA budget estimate for 1974
was an $11 billion deficit, or on a high-employment
basis, approximate balance. The NIA deficit which
was realized was $1.8 billion, and on a high-employ-
ment basis there was a recorded surplus of $9.2 billion.
Consequently, it appears that the budget provided
more restraint than was planned. To a certain extent
such a conclusion is valid, yet the degree of restraint
is distorted by the inflation factor. The restraining
effect of inflation as reflected in budget receipts holds
only to the extent that effectivetax rates are increased
because of inflation,
Mooetoc, Folio-p — The CEA’s primary emphasis is
always on fiscal policy, but general recommendations
are made about monetary policy. The 1974 CEA Re-
port represented a departure from tradition in that a
specific recommendation was made. The role formone-
tary policy was stated as follows:
The monetary expansion in the second half of 1973
can be described by an increase in the narrowly
defined money stock (M,) of somewhat under 5
percent and an increase in the broadly defined
money stock (M,) of about 8 percent, at annual
rates. Continued growth in M2 at approximately
this rate would be consistent with our expectations
concerning the increasein money CNP during 1974.~
The M2 definition of money rose 8.5 percent from
1973 to 1974, or somewhat more than recommended
by the CEA. Furthermore, the growth of M2 in 1974
was not steady throughout the year, growing at an 8.7
percent annual rate in the first half followed by a 5.8
percent rate of advance in the second half. Given the
nature of this path and the lags in the effect of policy,
the economic impact of realized M, growth in 1974
was probably little different than if a steady 8 percent
growth had occurred. The effect of the slowdown in
M2 in the second half of 1974 will tend to be reflected
in the course of economic activity in early 1975.
Although the CEA tended to dc-emphasize M,, a
steady 5 percent growth was considered as being con-
sistent with the CEA projection of GNP. M5 grew 5.6
percent in 1974. The pattern of rapid growth in the
first half followed by slower growth in the second
half was even more pronounced for M1 than M,.
rose at a 6.1 percent rate in the first six months
of 1974, and then the growth rate dropped sharply to
a 2.8 percent rate in the second half. Again, this
pattern of rapid money growth followed by sharply
lower growth probably had little effect on the in-
crease of GNP from 1973 to 1974 relative to a steady
5 percent rate, but such a slowing carries implications
for the advance of GNP in early 1975.
°1974CEA Report, pp. 31-32.
Money Stock
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A naip’s-is Rae-ed on the Sp Louis Mod-el
Even though the CEA projection of GNP for 1974
was on target, there was some indication that policy
plans deviated from realizations. To provide an esti-
mate of the effect of these deviations some ex post sim-
ulations of the St. Louis model are summarized. Since
the CEA’s GNP projection was on target, the St. Louis
model has little to explain, but such simulations are
given for the record.
The results of two cx post simulations of the St.
Louis model are summarized in Table V. The first
projection uses money and high-employment Federal
expenditures as actually recorded. The second projec-
tion is the result of using money and high-employment
expenditures consistent with the CEA policy recom-
mendations at the beginning of 1974.
The cx post projection using the actual movement
in the policy variables shows that the St. Louis model
projected the increase in GNP at $115 billion, or $13
billion more than actually occurred, Virtually all of the
error was concentrated in real product, as the model
successfully captured the movement of prices.°Even
though output was overestimated, the simulated aver-
age rate of unemployment was close to the realized
value.
The cx post projection using planned values for the
policy variables indicates that the net effect of policy
realizations was positive, that is, the effect on GNP of
the greater-than-planned increase in money more than
~In light of energy developments in 1974, the price equation
in the model was modified to include the direct effect of
rising oil prices on the general price levei. For discussion of
the original form of the price equation, along with the other
equations of the model, see Leonall C. Andersen and Keith
Xl. Carlson. “A Monetarist Model for Economic Stahiliza-
tion,” this Review (April 1970), pp. 7-25.
offset the effect of the less-than-expected
growth of Federal spending. In general, how-
ever, the differences between the two cx post
simulations are small relative to the total
error implicit in the model. In contrast to the
St. Louis model, the CEA was generally suc-
cessful in predicting the slowing in the income
velocity of money which occurred in 1974.
POLICY B.ECO]%-IMENDATIONS
FOR .1975
The Administration’s projections for 1975 of
a 10.8 percent rate of inflation and a 3.3 per-
cent decline in real product represents one
of the gloomiest forecasts made by any CEA
was created in 1946. The 1975 forecast ap-
reflects to a considerable extent the very
performance of the economy in the fourth
quarter of 1974, With unemployment rising sharply
and rapid inflation continuing, the data for the
fourth quarter provided little basis for optimism. The
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the 10.8 percent figure would indicate, since it reflects
the Administration’s plans to increase excise taxes on
oil and gas in an effort to encourage less dependence
on imports of petroleum. Even in the absence of an
energy program, the Administration estimates that
prices would presumably rise by 8 to 9 percent. The
CEA does not indicate what output would be in the
absence of increased excise taxes.
In general, the Administration’s projections for 1975
are very similar to actual experience in the previous
PROJECTED OIA.NFOES IN SPENDING, OUTPUT, PRIcES
AND UNEMPLOYMENT: 1973 10 1974
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year, as shown in Table VI. This similarity not only
holds for the change in GNP, output and prices, but
for most of the components of GNP as well. Projected
growth of purchases of goods and services by Federal,
state, and local governments is little different from
what actually took place in 1974. Personal consump-
tion is projected to advance slightly more rapidly,
presumably in response to proposed tax cuts and in-
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Projections of investment are somewhat differ nt
from 1974, with the change in inventory representing
the biggest deviation. In 1974, the rate of inventory
accumulation declined by $2 billion, but in 1975 the
CEA projects liquidation of inventory at a rate of $18.3
billion. As indicated in the CEA Report, a large part
of the inventory overhang consists of manufacturer
and dealer stocks of automobiles. Other investment
activity is also projected to be relatively weak in 1975.
Despite proposed increases in the investment tax
credit and decreases in corporate taxes, business fixed
investment is forecast to grow by only 4 percent in
1975. Residential construction activity is expected to
decline further, though the extent of the drop is much
smaller than in the previous year.
Fend-sal- B-udget Program for Cal ;-n-do-r 1975
The budget program for 1975 is one of the most
ambitious ever developed during peacetime in U.S.
history. Normally, snch a degree of fiscal activity oc-
curs only during wartime. However, the budget pro-
gram for 1975 represents an attempt to aggressively
and simultaneously attack the problems of unemploy-
ment and energy dependence. Inflation receives con-
sideration in the budget recommendations to the ex-
tent that expenditure increases are less than they
would otherwise be.
This section presents quantitative details of the
Federal budget program on an NIA basis for calendar
1975. For the first time, the Federal budget provides
considerable quarterly detail on the nature of the
budget program and underlying economic assump-
tions for the immediate future! In addition, long-term
projections through 1980 provide insights into the time
path envisioned by the Administration for key eco-
nornic variables. This presentation of additional in-
formation was not required for this budget according
to the provisions of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, but will be in
the future,
Expenditw-es — The budget program calls for an
increase in Federal expenditures of $46.3 biffion in
1975, or an increase of 15.5 percent over 1974. Federal
expenditures rose 13 percent in 1974 and at a 7.8
percent average rate from 1968 to 1973. If the recom-
mendations are realized, Federal expenditures would
rise to 23 percent of the nation’s GNP in 1975, com-
pared to 21.4 percent in 1974 and 18 percent in 1965.
These measures provide an approximation of the de-
gree of growing involvement of the Federal Govern-
ment in the U.S. economy. Not fully captured by such
measures is the extent of direct Governmental regula-
tions of economic activity in the form of product
reliability, occupational and consumer safety, and en-
vironmental control,
Defense spending is expected to increase 5.1 per-
cent in 1975, representing a continuation of the 5.6
percent increase in 1974. By way of contrast, defense
spending had declined at a 1 percent average rate
from 1968 to 1973, with most of the decline concen-
trated in 1970 and 1971. The projected increase in
defense spending reflects an attempt to meet the
higher costs of maintaining forces and stocks of equip-
ment and supplies as well as an effort to modernize
weapons systems and equipment.
Nondefense spending is projected to advance by
19.2 percent in 1975, compared to 16 percent in 1974
and a 12.8 percent average rate of increase from 1965
to 1973. The increase of nondefense spending in cal-
endar 1975 reflects primarily a massive increase in
transfer payments of $26.7 billion. Of this total, $11.1
billion represents an increase in unemployment bene-
fits. The proportion of Federal expenditures in the
form of transfer payments has grown from 26.3 percent
in 1965 to an estimated 41,7 percent in 1975.
~This quarterly detail on the budget is found in The Bvdget
of the United State-s Government, Fiscal Year 1976, Special
Analysis A.
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Receipts — Federal receipts on an NIA basis are
projected to decline by $8.4 billion in 1975. By com-
parison, such receipts rose $32.6 billion in 1974, or 12.6
percent. This sharp turnabout in receipts results pri-
marily from the forces of recession, though the Ad-
ministration’s program also contributes to the decline.
Table VII provides estimates of the sources of
change in the Federal budget from 1974 to 1975. If
the economy were operating continuously at high-
employment, it is estimated that at projected inflation
rates Federal receipts would rise by $47.3 billion. The
projection of further deterioration of real economic
activity is estimated to have the effect of reducing
revenues by $36 billion, while the effect of the Admin-
istration’s tax proposals is to reduce revenues by an
additional $19.7 billion,
Proposed tax changes consist of (1) a temporary tax
reduction in the fonn of a tax rebate on 1974 income
for individuals; (2) permanent reductions in the rate
structure for individuals and an increase in the mini-
mum standard deduction; (3) a temporary increase
in the investment tax credit for businesses; (4) a per-
manent cut in corporate income taxes; (5) increased
excise taxes on oil and natural gas; and (6) a windfall-
profits tax on oil companies. In addition, as a result
of past legislation, the tax base for social security
contributions was increased from $13,200 to $14,100
effective January 1, 1975.
Surplws/De-ficit Pos-ition — The combined effect of
rapidly rising expenditures and declining receipts is
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Table ‘. II We delicti projected Lu mcie~~sc by .~54.6
billion — from ‘~7.6billion in 1974 to $62.2 biffion in
1975.
Another way to view the genesis of the deficit is to
note that trend growth of receipts and increases in
expenditures for defense and existing nondefense pro-
grams would produce a decline in the deficit of $12.1
billion (47.3-4.0- 31.2 = 12.1). In other words, with-
out deepening recession and proposed tax cuts, the
net budget position would switch from a $7.6 billion
deficit in 1974 to a $4.5 billion surplus in 1975. How-
ever, the recession reduces receipts by $36 billion from
this hypothetical level and increases expenditures (un-
employment benefits) by $11.1 billion, So it is esti-
mated that without the proposed tax changes the
deficit would be $42.5 billion, but a $19.7 billion net
tax reduction pushes the deficit to $62.2 billion in
1975.
With the budget position obviously influenced by
recessionary forces, calculations on a high-employment
basis are also provided in Table VII. This measure
supposedly provides a more accurate indication of the
thrust of the budget on economic activity. According
to this measure, fiscal actions are planned to provide a
stimulus of $12.5 billion to the economy in 1975. It
should be noted, however, that this calculation is in-
fluenced in considerable measure by inflation. The
inflationary bias implicit in the calculation of the high-
employment budget indicates that the budget is
planned to be even more stimulative than the $12.5
billion shift in the high-employment budget would
Federal Government Expenditures
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indicate. There is no accepted method of correcting
the numbers for this inflation bias.8
Monetary Policy Recosnmendat-io-ns for 1975
The Administration’s focus is on fiscal policy, yet
there are some well chosen words spoken with regard
to monetary policy. In contrast to the 1974 CEA Re-
port, the latest report shied away from offering specific
quantitative recommendations for monetary policy.
The CEA makes the following statement about mon-
etary policy:
Monetary policy faces great difficulties in the year
ahead and will require careful and continuous eval-
uation by the Federal Reserve. The uncertainties
that underhe the outlook for 1975 add to the fin-
portance of a flexible monetary policy. Monetary pol-
icy must be conducted so as to encourage a near-
term recovery in the economy and a resumption of
sustainable economic growth. Toward this end, rea-
sonable growth in money and credit will be required
— growth which, one hopes, will encourage a freer
flow of credit and lower interest rates in private
credit markets.°
This recommendation conveys little meaning since
imprecise words like “flexible” and “reasonable” are
used. Reference to a freer flowof credit, however, does
suggest a step-up in the rate of monetary and credit
expansion from the rates of late 1974. More subtle
recommendations for monetary policy, which appear
to be implicit in the overall economic program, are
discussed in the next section.
FSVALUATION OF
1975 ECONOMIC PROGRAM
According to the CEA, “The most pressing concern
of policy is to halt the decline in production and
employment so that growth of output can resume and
unemployment can be reduced ....The policies that
we use to support the economy in 1975 must be con-
sistent with a further reduction in inflation in 1976
and thereafter.”t° Despite this primary emphasis on
stimulating the economy in the short run, the CEA’s
long-run projections through 1980 indicate that gains
in reducing unemployment are not expected to come
quickly, nor is the rate of inflation projected to drop
8
For further discussion of the relationship between inflation
and the high-employment budget, see the 1975 CEA Report,
pp. 62-65, lnelnded in this discussion is an alternative cal-
culation of the high-employment budget which includes al-
lowance for the effect of inflation on inventory profits.
‘~1975 CEA Report, p. 26.
101975 CEA Report, p. 19.
U-S
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sharply. If forces have already been set in motion to
reduce the rate of inflation sharply in 1975 and 1976,
a given growth in GNP will be distributed more
heavily toward real product gains.
Playing a strategic role in such an assessment is
the rate of monetary expansion. Despite wide ac-
ceptance of the direct relationship between the trend
growth of money and the rate of inflation over ex-
tended periods, there is nothing in the CEA Report
or the Federal budget documents that provides an
inkling of what monetary assumptions underlie the
long-range projections. Yet the budget presents a
scenario for GNP, prices, and output for the period
1975 to 1980.
For purposes of gaining some insight into the ex-
pected effects of monetary and fiscal actions in 1975
and beyond, some simulation results of the St. Louis
model are presented and compared with the CEA
projections. Econometric models inevitably have seri-
ous shortcomings in providing information about the
probable course of future economic events; yet, being
based on the experience of the past, their implications
should not be overlooked,h1 Model results have to be
given a liberal interpretation, because events of the
t1
For a discussion and evaluation of the forecasting perform-
ance of econometric models of the U.S. economy, includ-
ing the St. Louis model, see Carl F. Christ, “Jndging the
Performance of Econometric Models of the U.S. Economy,”
International Economic Review (February 1975).
Labor Market Trends
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last two years have all but destroyed the myth that
economic forecasting has become a precise science.
It is to be noted that the St. Louis model is a policy-
oriented model which is based solely on past experi-
ence. Being a small model, the options are quite
limited in dealing with the operation of special factors
like energy crises or variations in food supply. Never-
theless, with energy problems looming so large that
they cannot be sensibly ignored, the model has been
modified to capture some of the effects of rising energy
prices. This modification consists of two changes: (1)
adding an excise tax variable to the price equation,
except that excise tax is interpreted broadly to in-
clude the increase in the price of foreign oil in 1975
and 1974; and (2) changing the assumptions about
the level and growth of potential output to reflect the
adjustment of aggregate supply to increased energy
costs and environmental regulations.
Within the context of the St. Louis model, the Ad-
ministration’s projected increase in GNP is examined
to determine if it is consistent with their policy pro-
posals. A second exercise consists of an evaluation of
the price and output projections given the forecast of
GNP. A comparison of Administration projections with
those of the St. Louis model is in no way capable of
producing definitive conclusions, yet it is important to
scrutinize these projections within the context of an
alternative model. The comparison is very tentative,
however, because the Administration’s model is not
made explicit.
Pcosibiiitu of GA’i? Project -ion
The Administration’s projection of an increase in
GNP of $101.3 billion in 1975, or 7.3 percent, is ex-
amined by comparing it with two simulations of the
St. Louis model. One simulation uses a 6 percent
steady rate of increase of M1 and the other uses an
8 percent rate. Both alternatives would represent an
acceleration from the 2.8 percent increase that pre-
vailed in the second half of 1974. Even though 1975
receives major emphasis, the CEA also makes a pro-
jection for 1976. The forecast for 1976, which, in-
cidentally, is presented in the Federal budget and not
discussed in the CEA Report, is for a $188 billion
increase in GNP, or 12.6 percent. This assumption of
a sharp increase in GNP growth requires further
examination.
Both simulations use the path of high-employment
Federal expenditures implied in the Federal budget.
The money assumptions use fourth quarter 1974 as a
point of departure. It should be noted, however, that
at this time there appears to be little likelihood that
either a 6 or 8 percent growth of money will be
achieved in first quarter 1975.
The results of these combinations of policies are
shown in Table VIII. The assumption of 6 percent
money growth yields a projection somewhat less than
the CEA projection of 7.3 percent growth of GNP in
1975, but the difference is substantial in 1976. Where-
as the CEA has a projected increase of GNP of 12.6
percent, the St. Louis model indicates that a steady
increase in money at 6 percent would yield only a
7.6 percent increase in GNP.
Table Vt I
PROJECTED MANGES N GM?
1975 AND 1976
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The assumption of 8 percent money growth gives
a GNP for 1975 that is only marginally above the
CEA projection. The faster monetary alternative also
comes much closer than the 6 percent case to the
CEA projection in 1976, though it still falls short by
a substantial margin.
These simulation results raise questions about either
the nature of the monetary policy recommendation in
the CEA Report or the reliability of the St. Louis
model. An interpretation of the CEA Report is that
they are most concerned about accelerating the rate
of monetary expansion in the short term. Such actions,
according to the St. Louis model, indicate that accel-
eration to 6 to 8 percent will provide the CEA fore-
cast increase in 1975, but realization of their 1976
forecast would require further acceleration of money
growth starting in late 1975. This pattern appears
inconsistent with the CEA objective of first stimulating
demand and then, once the recovery is underway,
shifting the focus of policy actions to controlling
inflation.
There is an alternative interpretation, however, and
that is that the CEA envisions a rapid advance in the
income velocity of money as the recovery gets under-
way. This is a plausible assumption, though the im-
plicit rise in velocity in 1976 for the 6 percent money
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case is very high relative to past ex-
perience. Given the Administration’s
GNP projections, a 6 percent growth
of money would imply velocity growth
of 2 percent in 1975 and 6.2 percent in
1976. An increase in velocity of 6.2 per-
cent would be the largest for any one
year since 1951.
Iinpli-cat-i-ons of Total ~wnding
P-rojectioris
Given the CEA projections of GNP
for 1975 and 1976, aside from the mat-
ter of how they are achieved, leaves
open the question of how GNP growth
is going to be distributed between prices
and output. This question is, of course,
the critical one as evidenced by the
success that the CEA enjoyed in project-
ing the advance of GNP in 1974, but the
failure to accurately forecast its dis-
tribution between prices and output.
The task of projecting prices and output continues
to be complicated by the operation of special factors.
Even though the oil embargo was lifted last spring,
it appears that price and output adjustments to higher
energy prices are still taking place. Furthermore, the
Administration’s budget program contains an energy
package that will require further adjustments. Also,
even though wage and price controls were lifted in
early 1974, there is a question of the long-term dam-
age which this program imparted to the economy by
distorting the allocation of resources. And finally,
environmental regulations have become so pervasive
in their influence that they can no longer be ignored
in the determination of the growth in the nation’s
productive capacity.
To deal with these problems within the context of
the St. Louis model, assumptions had to be made
about the time path of potential output. Given the
energy program proposed by the Administration, it
was assumed that the course of potential output has
been, and will continue to be, affected by higher
energy prices and environmental regulations. The
growth of potential output was assumed to be 3 per-
cent.n To provide perspective, simulations were con-
ducted through 1980 and compared with those of the
Administration.
Table IX contains the results of these simulations
of the St. Louis model. The first simulation uses a 6
12The 3 percent figure is mentioned as a possibility in the
1975 CEA Report, pp. 63-64.
percent growth in M~but in contrast to Table VIII,
assumes a trend growth in velocity of 2.9 percent.~’
Federal spending is assumed to follow the course
outlined in the budget. As noted earlier, the 1975
GNP projection for this case is essentially the same
as the Administration’s. In addition, there is virtually
no difference in the projections of prices, output, and
unemployment.
The picture in 1976 is much different, however,
since a 6 percent growth in money does not come
near generating the CEA’s projected increase. The
St. Louis model has the rate of inflation dropping to
6.6 percent in 1976, substantially below the CEA’s
projection of 7.5 percent. Because of the lower GNP
projection in 1976, the St. Louis model shows a weaker
~~The reservations expressed about velocity growth in 1976
also apply to the Administration’s longer-term projections.
Civen their 1980 CNP projection, the following combina-
tions of money and velocity growth would yield such GNP
growth from 1974 to 1980:
Table IX
PROJECTED CHANGES IN GNP, OUTPUT, PRICES,
AND EMPLOYMENT: 1975 - 1980
I Parcent
1975 2976 1977 1978 1979 1980
CEA Prajt’ctton 12 4 751
GNP 7.3 02.6 12.4 120 10.8 ~0.S
Output ‘33 4.8 5.6 65 6.5 6.5
Price, tO.8 7.5 65 5.1 4.1 40
Unemploynoc-nt Rate 8.1 7.9 7.5 6.9 6 2 5.5
St ~ouis Mood Projeciton
With cEA Budget Plan, o%
Money Growth, and Y~ocity
Growth of 2.9%
GNP 7.3 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.0 8.8
OutpQt —3.2 2.8 5.2 6.3 6.7 6.6
Prteu 10.8 6.6 4.1 2.9 2.2 2.1
Ur.emplayment Rate 8.2 8.8 8.6 8.1 7.3 6.5
121 With Approximate ~EA
GNP Growth Poth
GNP 74 12.5 12.4 11.9 11.0 10.7
Output 3.1 5.1 7.0 7.0 6.6 5.2
Prcos 10.7 7.2 5.1 45 4.0 52
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recovery in real product, only 2.8 percent in contrast
with the CEA estimate of 4.8 percent. And because
real product would rise more slowly, the St. Louis
model indicates that the unemployment rate would
rise to 8.8 percent. On the basis of these policy as-
sumptions, however, both prices and unemployment
would improve each year from 1976 through 1980.
In order to assess the validity of the CEA’s projec-
tions of prices, output, and unemployment, the CEA’s
projected GNP path is taken as given in a St. Louis
model simulation. This means that the question of
attaining GNP is set aside to concentrate on the price
and output projections. Since the 6 percent money
alternative (with accelerated velocity) for the model
was so close to the CEA projection for 1975, the
simulation using the CEA GNP path is little different
for that year. According to the St. Louis model, an
acceleration of CNP has its primary effect on output
in the short run. As a result, with prices little affected,
say, compared to the case with 6 percent money, out-
put jumps sharply to a 5.1 percent rate of increase in
1976. The high rate of GNP growth keeps inflation
relatively high and produces an acceleration beginning
in 1980. In contrast, even with high GNP growth, the
CEA has inflation coming down steadily to 4 percent
by 1980.
These simulations, based on varying assumptions,
yield the following conclusions:
(1) The 1975 CEA projections of prices and out-
put appear to he consistent with the path of GNP
that they forecast.
(2) Shortly after 1975, there is an indication that
the CEA might he too pessimistic on prices, which
also leads to the possibility that output growth might
~It should he noted that these projections are based on an
updated version of the St. Louis model as originally specified
in 1970. According to the model, and despite recent ex-
perience with inflation, the price level is very slow to respond
to a sustained acceleration in the growth of money and total
spending. More recent work at the Bank indicates that a
maintained growth in money of 6 percent would produce
an inflation late of between 5 and 6 percent by 1980. See
Leonall C Andersen and Denis S. Kamosky, “The Appro-
priate Time Frame for Controlling Monetary Aggregates:
The St. Louis Evidence,” Controlling Monetary Aggregate-i
ii: The implementation (Proceedings of a Conference Held
at Melvin Village, New Hampshire, Sponsored by the Fed-
eral Resen’e Bank of Boston, September 1972). pp. 147-177.
be greater in the short run under their GNP
assumptions.
(3) By the end of the decade, it appears that the
CEA GNP path does not produce the steady decline
in inflation and unemployment that they expect. In-
flation stays high and, as a result, output growth is
correspondingly less than the CEA projects.
SUTIMARY
The Administration has projected another year of
rapid inflation and declining output. A projected im-
provement is hidden in the averages, however, as out-
put is forecast to rise in the second half of 1975 and
the rate of inflation is expected to decline. The Ad-
ministration also offers a scenario for the rest of the
decade such that by 1980 the inflation rate is reduced
to 4 percent and the unemployment rate is reduced to
5.5 percent.
Despite the publication of long-range projections,
the Administration program focuses on fiscal actions
for the next 21 months. The budget program contains
considerable stimulus in the form of tax cuts and con-
tinued increases in Federal spending. However, the
monetary actions that they consider consistent with
their 1975 economic program are not made explicit.
Using the St. Louis model as an aid in evaluating
the economic plan, there was little basis for quarreling
with the 1975 forecast. Beyond 1975, however, some
questions were raised about the likelihood of boosting
the growth of GN-P to the assumed rates without
setting in motion further inflation problems later on.
Rising inflation in the future also means that the
growth in output is correspondingly reduced.
The Administration is confronted with very serious
economic problems and has presented a program to
deal with these problems. Despite the urgency of re-
suming output growth, according to the analysis of this
article, the problem of inflation control continues par-
amount. There is little prospect for sustainable long-
run growth until inflation is purged from the economic
system. It is this goal that provides the challenge to
the monetary authority to maintain a moderate ex-
pansion of money and credit in the face of huge
budget deficits.
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